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Evidence Obtained from RemoteElectronic Traffic Devices:
An Argument for Admissibility in Civil and Criminal Contexts
Jessica Wang

E

vidence obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices is
taking on increasing importance as evidenced by the struggle over restrictions on the devices1 as well as the Supreme
Court’s recent unusual step of linking to a video featuring
footage from a police officer chasing after a speeding driver.2 As
law-enforcement officials rely more and more on this type of
evidence to issue citations and defend against criminal proceedings, courts must grapple with the admissibility of photographic and video evidence obtained from red-light cameras,
speeding cameras, and black boxes or cameras on a police car.
This article focuses on the rationales of evidence exclusion
and notes that as an intrinsic rule, or a rule focused on the pursuit of truth, when determining whether to admit the evidence
one must consider the three foundational factors of (1) materiality and relevance, (2) authenticity, and (3) competence.3
On balance, in civil cases, courts should almost always admit
the evidence unless it is clear that it is fabricated or flawed.
They should also follow the approaches of caselaw and err on
the side of admitting the evidence but allow the defendant to
argue issues as to authenticity when determining the weight of
the evidence. However, the balance changes in criminal cases,
which usually involve a jury and therefore also implicate jury
risks. In these circumstances, courts should still almost always
admit the evidence, but they should recognize the potential
prejudice of videotaped evidence in particular and take steps to
mitigate it, such as reviewing the evidence early in the proceeding to make sure the evidence is not especially prejudicial.
In the special case of summary judgment or other instances
where the court takes the decision out of the hands of the jury,
the court should be especially careful to preserve legitimacy
because juries serve important goals. More specifically, courts
should recognize the differing viewpoints of the parties as well
as the viewpoints that the evidence might elicit in jurors, particularly if the evidence is in the form of a video. Courts
should also avoid a sensorial jurisprudence which uses language that hints the judges themselves have fallen prey to the
biasing effects of the evidence. Both of these steps will help the
court retain legitimacy and therefore give the court a way to
admit the evidence without placing undue import on it.
Part I briefly discusses the goals of evidence law and focuses
on the concerns underlying intrinsic rules, which are focused

on the pursuit of truth. Part II briefly outlines my proposal.
Part II.A. discusses civil law and concludes that on balance,
this type of evidence should almost always be admitted. In
addition, as current caselaw dictates, courts should also allow
parties to raise questions regarding the accuracy of the evidence at trial. Part II.B. turns to criminal law, where jury trials
are more frequent for cases with factual disputes. It begins by
acknowledging that while the balance regarding the potential
prejudicial effect of the evidence alters slightly—because
videos that are powerful forms of evidence are more likely to
surface in this context—procedural safeguards are sufficient to
counteract these biases and evidence still should almost always
be admissible. Next, this article turns to jury risks and likewise concludes that these risks do not necessitate the exclusion of evidence. It continues by discussing how current
caselaw supports these conclusions as well as providing guidance for courts in this dilemma. Finally, this article concludes
by drawing lessons from Scott v. Harris, a Supreme Court case
involving video footage from a police officer driving after a
speeding defendant, and argues that courts should refrain from
putting too much weight on the admitted evidence, which
results in a sensorial jurisprudence, and should instead be
careful to preserve its legitimacy.

Footnotes
1. See Robin Miller, Automated Traffic Enforcement Sytems, 26 A.L.R.
179, § 2 (2007).
2. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379 n.5 (2007).
3. See Jordan S. Gruber, Videotape Evidence, 44 AM. JUR. TRIALS 171,
§ 4 (2009).

4. See Lisa Dufraimont, Evidence Law and the Jury: A Reassessment, 53
MCGILL L.J. 199, 205 (2008). See also MIRJAN R. DAMA KA,
EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 12-17 (1997).
5. See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
689 (Peter Tillers ed., 1983).
6. See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, MODERN VISUAL EVIDENCE § 4.02[5] (1984).
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I. BACKGROUND: INTRINSIC RULES AND THE
FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS OF MATERIALITY AND
RELEVANCE, AUTHENTICITY, AND COMPETENCE

Before discussing the admissibility of evidence obtained by
remote-electronic devices, one must first understand evidence
law’s underlying goals. Rules of evidence are divided into two
categories: intrinsic and extrinsic rules.4 Intrinsic rules are
concerned with facilitating the pursuit of truth. In contrast,
extrinsic rules are concerned with advancing other policies as
exemplified by the rules regarding privilege.5 The rules governing admissions of evidence obtained from remote-electronic traffic devices are intrinsic rules because they focus on
the pursuit of truth. As just one example, consider the bestevidence rule in federal and state evidence law, which requires
photographs, including videos, to be the original in order to
prove its contents.6 Although “original” has been defined as
“any print” of a photograph and thus videos can be any video-

tape of acceptable quality,7 the essential concern about the
authenticity of the evidence remains.
Given that evidence obtained by remote-electronic traffic
devices are governed by intrinsic rules, judges consider foundational requirements that are focused on the pursuit of truth
when determining whether to admit the evidence. These three
factors are (1) materiality and relevance, (2) authenticity, and
(3) competence.8 Materiality and relevance are closely tied
because evidence cannot be relevant without being material.
Material evidence must relate to a substantive issue in the case
or, in other words, be “material to the question in controversy.”9
Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of [a material fact] more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.”10 Authenticity relates
to whether the evidence itself is authentic. Finally, competence
refers to whether the evidence violates “any legislative or evidentiary exclusionary policy” which in this context primarily
focuses on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and parallel state rules
regarding exclusion of evidence based on undue prejudice to
the defendant.11 Against this backdrop, this article now turns
to assessing the admissibility of evidence obtained by remoteelectronic traffic devices in civil and criminal cases.

evidence and essentially adopting a sensorial jurisprudence.

II. PROPOSAL: COURTS SHOULD ALMOST ALWAYS
ADMIT EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY REMOTE
ELECTRONIC TRAFFIC DEVICES

i. Evidence obtained by remote-electronic devices almost
always satisfies the three foundational factors of materiality and relevance, authenticity, and competence
When considering the three factors of materiality and relevance, authenticity, and competence, it becomes clear that evidence obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices should
almost always be admitted.
First, this type of evidence easily satisfies the materiality
and relevance factors because the photos or videos are contemporaneous depictions of the moment the violation
occurred. The evidence is thus material to the legal issue, and
also relevant because the photograph or video’s existence
makes it more probable that the violation occurred.
Evidence obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices also
satisfies the authenticity test. First of all, this type of evidence
is contemporaneous direct evidence, which is evidence that
records the moment in controversy and proves an ultimate fact
in the case without needing intermediate inferences.14 Thus,
they are in essence “silent witnesses”15 and courts can almost
always safely admit the evidence when the government verifies
the fairness and accuracy. The government can easily do so
through showing that the video was not altered while going
through a known chain-of-custody, bringing in a photographic
or video expert who can testify that nothing was altered or
faked,16 or even just citing which speed camera was used, as

When considering the three foundational factors, it
becomes clear that courts should almost always admit evidence obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices in civil
contexts. However, courts should allow questions as to the
authenticity of the evidence that go toward the weight of the
evidence even after admitting it. In the criminal context, the
weighing of the three foundational factors changes because
video is more likely to be introduced, thereby increasing the
prejudicial effects on the defendant. However, on balance, the
evidence should still be admissible because of procedural safeguards mitigating this risk as well as the great probative value
of the evidence. Jury risks do not necessitate the exclusion of
the evidence, either; indeed, current caselaw supports this
conclusion as well as suggesting guidelines like routinely
reviewing the evidence before admitting it. Finally, when
faced with a summary-judgment case involving this type of
evidence, courts should be very cognizant of the rationales
behind why juries are in place. To preserve legitimacy, courts
should do a mental check or engage in judicial humility to be
careful to word their opinion neutrally so that they credit the
viewpoints of the driver and potential jurors as well as being
careful to avoid falling prey to undue reliance on the video

7. See id.
8. See Gruber, supra note 3, at § 4.
9. Id. at § 54.
10. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401).
11. Id.
12. It is difficult to imagine officers purposefully manipulating images
even if techniques are available to do so.
13. See generally Note, The Philadelphia Traffic Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 848 (1961).

A. Civil-Law Context

In civil cases,
courts should
almost always
admit evidence
obtained by
remote-electronic
traffic devices.

In civil cases, courts should
almost always admit evidence
obtained by remote-electronic
traffic devices. Indeed, the only
time that the court should not
be admitting the evidence is if it
is clearly fabricated, which is
highly unlikely.12 If there are minor disputes as to the authenticity of the evidence, the court should err on the side of admitting it but allow the defendant to raise those arguments at trial
to dispute the weight of the evidence.
At the outset, it is important to understand that traffic citations are infractions and thus will usually be heard in traffic
court or the lowest-level state court. While there are some
variations among the states in their treatment of the citations,
it is safe to assume that the case will be heard in front of one
judge.13 Thus, because juries are not implicated in these civil
cases, the balance struck will differ from that of criminal cases.

14. Gruber, supra note 3, at § 44.
15. Most courts support the silent-witness theory now and have abandoned prior requirements such as a seven-prong test. See id. at §§
59-60.
16. See id. at § 60. For example, studies show that red-light cameras
are usually very accurate. See generally Christina M. Mulligan,
Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to Limit and When to Use
Technology, 14 RICH J.L. & TECH. 13 (2008).
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one state has recently
required in an effort to
address authenticity concerns.17
Finally, when considering competence, the probative value of the evidence
outweighs the potential
prejudice against the defendant. As discussed earlier,
photos or videos are contemporaneous direct evidence, so they
have a very strong probative value.18 Weighed against this is
the potential prejudice against the defendant. Here, it is
unlikely that the defendant would be unfairly prejudiced by
the admission of the evidence. Although it is true that videos
in particular may cause viewers to overvalue the evidence,19
the fact remains that in civil matters, such biases are not as
prevalent because these cases deal with small traffic infractions. It is difficult to imagine that a photo or video of a car
driving through a red light can cause too much sensationalism
in the viewer. Moreover, the concern about bias is not as relevant with traffic-court judges who have some experience after
regularly dealing with these types of cases. Indeed, one study
even found that magistrate judges seemed to dismiss the
charges with great frequency,20 and so although there have
been very few studies on the bias of individual judges, it is
probably safe to assume that it seems unlikely that admitting
the evidence would unfairly prejudice the defendant.
Moreover, while the concern may take on greater weight with
appeals courts where judges may not be as experienced with
traffic matters, it is probably safe to assume that most cases end
in traffic court and it would thus be illogical to exclude the evidence just because there is a slight chance that an appeals
judge would be prejudiced against the defendant. Because
contemporaneous direct evidence is extremely probative and
the potential for unfair prejudice is not very salient, evidence
obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices satisfies all three
foundational requirements and thus should almost always be
admitted into evidence in civil cases.

Current caselaw . . .
overwhelmingly
supports admitting
evidence obtained
by remote-electronic
traffic devices.

ii. Current caselaw supports admitting evidence obtained by
remote-electronic traffic devices and suggests that minor
authenticity disputes should only go toward the weight of
the evidence instead of its admissibility
Current caselaw also overwhelmingly supports admitting
evidence obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices. In state
after state, courts generally admit the evidence.21 Although

17. Florida’s recent rule requires officers to list the type and serial
number of the speed-measuring device in citations. See Thomas
A. Cobitz, Annual Reports of Florida Bar Committees, 82 FLA. B.J.
34, 76 (2008).
18. See Gruber, supra note 3, at § 62.
19. Part II.B. discusses the powerful effects of videos in greater depth.
20. See Note, supra note 13, at 864-68 (finding that magistrate judges
regularly dismissed citations due to personal and political pressures because they were elected officials).
21. See Gruber, supra note 3, at § 62.
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there is some variance in how much each state has relaxed its
authentication requirements, with some still requiring a proof
of the chain-of-custody for instance,22 the government usually
easily fulfills these requirements and so courts consistently
continue to admit the evidence.
These cases also give some guidance for how courts should
be treating minor challenges to the evidence’s authenticity. In
general, courts would do better to admit the evidence and then
have the parties raise points about the authenticity in court
instead of excluding the evidence altogether. Indeed, appellate
courts have shown a “great reluctance”23 to limit the trial
court’s discretion, particularly because of the subjective nature
of the weighing. Moreover, appellate courts frequently affirm
a lower court’s decision to find a violation even when the
defendant protested the admission and reliability of the evidence, such as a defendant’s protestation over the admission of
results from a photo-speed recorder24 or an objection that a
particular device was being used for the first time.25 In contrast, appellate courts are more likely to reverse when the trial
court finds the evidence insufficient,26 as exemplified by one
appellate court that reversed the trial court’s finding that the
dispute about the technician’s response regarding calibration of
the device was enough to find no violation.27 The same pattern rises when looking at cases involving videotapes with
courts often finding that minor disputes as to authenticity
should not go toward admissibility. Indeed, many cases
involving videotaped evidence have found that even when the
tape is edited, it should still be admitted with the determinations as to the authenticity going toward the weight or credibility of the evidence.28 By analogy, although the government
should certainly try to avoid editing the photo or video, these
principles should also be applied to this context. Overall,
caselaw dealing with both evidence obtained from remote-electronic traffic devices as well as cases just dealing with videotape evidence both support the proposition that courts should
admit this type of evidence, but allow defendants to raise
minor disputes about the authenticity at trial.
B. Criminal-Law Context

The balance struck in civil cases involving evidence
obtained from remote-electronic traffic devices changes in
criminal cases because a jury is often introduced into the equation. In this situation, courts should still admit the evidence,
again allowing defendants to dispute authenticity issues in
trial. However, in cases where the court takes some portion of
the decision away from the jury, the court should take special
care when giving its opinion to avoid losing legitimacy.

22. See id.
23. See id. at § 53.
24. See Com. v. Buxton, 205 Mass. 49, 91 N.E. 128 (1910).
25. See People v. Pett, 13 Misc. 2d 975, 178 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Police Ct.
1958).
26. See Gruber, supra note 3, at § 53.
27. See City of Wilmington v. Minella, 879 A.2d 656 (Del. Super. Ct.
2005).
28. See Gruber, supra note 3, at § 53.

i. Evidence obtained by remote-electronic devices almost
always satisfies the three factors of materiality and relevance, authenticity, and competence, although admittedly
the balance does alter slightly when evaluating competence
In criminal-law cases, the same three foundational requirements of materiality and relevance, authenticity, and competence must still be satisfied. Materiality and relevance as well
as authenticity are still easily satisfied as discussed in Part II.A.
However, while overall the competence factor still weighs in
favor of admission, introducing a jury will give more weight to
concern about the prejudicial effects on the defendant, particularly in the case of videotaped evidence obtained from a
remote-electronic traffic device.
As discussed earlier, videotape evidence is by its nature
“extremely persuasive, vivid, and unforgettable.”29 However,
while civil cases typically involve non-sensationalist evidence
such as photos of a car running a red light, criminal cases are
more likely to involve videos of a car chase or other potentially
provocative images. Studies show that viewers are generally
likely to accept the contents of the video as truth.30 In addition, there have been startling studies that demonstrate that
viewers are more likely to see a confession as more voluntary
and correspondingly that the defendant is more guilty when
the video shows only the defendant as opposed to when it
shows both the defendant and the police officer eliciting the
confession.31 While no such similar studies have been done
with car chases for instance, it may well be possible that a view
from the dashboard of a police car will cause viewers to be
more likely to view the defendant as the one voluntarily beginning the car chase and therefore more at fault, which may
impact related civil cases in which a private party seeks damages based on a claim that officers used excessive force and the
jury must determine the relative culpability of the parties.32
However, a critical difference between videotaped confessions
and video obtained from remote-electronic traffic devices is
that law enforcement cannot significantly alter the placement
of the camera. Thus, even if there were a bias in car chase or
arrest scenarios, there seems to be little that can be done to
avoid it. Such instances are more spontaneous, and it obviously is not feasible to pause the chase in order to have a police
car drive to the side of both vehicles or to have a helicopter flying overhead in order to get a wider view and avoid the potential bias that may result from a limited perspective. Even if the
concerns about bias have greater strength because the viewer is
a lay juror instead of the more experienced judges in traffic
court, the party will have the opportunity to counteract this
bias through giving his or her version of events at trial with the
added benefit that he or she will be much more likely to tell the
truth because of the admission of this evidence. In the end, as

29. Id. at § 74.
30. See Comment, Computer Simulations and Video Re-Enactments:
Fact, Fantasy and Admission Standards, 17 OHIO N. UNIV. L. REV.
145, 146 (1990).
31. See Sharon Begley, Videocameras, Too, Can Lie, or at Least Create
Jury Prejudice, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2003, at B1.
32. See George M. Dery III, The Needless “Slosh” Through the “Morass
of Reasonableness”: The Supreme Court’s Usurpation of Fact Finding

contemporaneous direct eviWith the
dence, these videos hold great
introduciton of a
probative weight, and as such,
courts should continue to
jury, it becomes
admit them into evidence when necessary to also
balancing it against its prejudidiscuss the risks
cial effects. Thus, while the
potential prejudicial effect of
attendant with
the evidence has greater weight
that jury . . . .
in the criminal context, overall,
the evidence should still be
introduced because it satisfies the foundational requirements.
ii. Exclusion of evidence as a form of jury control
With the introduction of a jury, it becomes necessary to also
discuss the risks attendant with that jury and why such risks
do not necessitate the exclusion of evidence obtained from
remote-electronic traffic devices. Indeed, although evidence
law can be explained through a combination of theories, the
jury-oriented one is the most orthodox and indeed the most
relevant concern, particularly in exclusion-of-evidence contexts.33 In general, there are three risks associated with juries:
(1) bias, (2) lawlessness, and (3) adjudicative incompetence.
Bias is the concern that jurors have preexisting biases because
of their backgrounds and that these biases will influence their
judgment. Lawlessness is the concern that juries in their discretion may sometimes flout the law. Finally, adjudicative
incompetence is the concern that as lay people, jurors will misunderstand the value of the evidence or fail to understand the
legal instructions and therefore come to the wrong conclusion.34 All of these risks could and indeed should be counteracted if the court follows certain procedures and thus they do
not necessitate that the evidence obtained from remote-electronic traffic devices be excluded.
First, bias is often dealt with in the jury-selection process.
In fact, one could even show the evidence, particularly if it is
videotape evidence, to the potential jurors in voir dire to determine whether some jurors have particularly strong biases
toward the video.35 However, jurors probably would not have
an especially strong prejudicial reaction solely due to a photo
of a car running through a red light. The same likely holds
true even if the evidence is a video of a car chase because again,
prior biases would likely be uncovered in the normal juryselection process, and it seems unlikely that a juror would have
such a strong individualized reaction to seeing the video that
he or she should be individually removed through the challenge-for-cause process. Thus, the normal jury-selection
process should probably be enough to counter bias concerns
even in this context.

Powers in Assessing Reasonable Force in Scott v. Harris, 18 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 417, 444 (2008) (discussing Scott v. Harris
and noting that viewing the scene from the cop’s point of view
may cause viewers to identify with the cop).
33. See Dufraimont, supra note 4, at 220-21.
34. See id. at 214-15.
35. See Gruber, supra note 3, at § 74.
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Second is the concern
about lawlessness, which
again is dealt with through
jury-control processes. To
make sure juries follow the
law, jurors swear an oath to
do so and legal instructions
will instruct them on what to
do.36 In conjunction with this is the negative control of not
telling juries about their power to potentially ignore law,37 and
instead leaving the decision up to them.38 Although these controls are somewhat week, this is all that can be done to prevent
jury lawlessness because the jury system itself is ambivalent
about the jury's power. That is, although lawlessness can be
seen as a negative risk, it can also sometimes work as a positive factor or a defensive safeguard when the law itself may be
unjust, which is why there cannot be excessive controls to stifle jury lawlessness.39
Finally, there is the concern about adjudicative incompetence. To begin, one must have a point of comparison—
namely, what standard of competence are we comparing the
jury’s to? Some might frame the issue by comparing jurors to
a competent individual judge such as perhaps those in the traffic court.40 However, a better starting point is to recognize that
all jurors and judges have some biases or frailties in reasoning
that might lead them to make faulty decisions,41 and thus, any
decision to admit or exclude evidence on this basis must be
justified because it will truly be effective in eliminating or substantially reducing these problems.
In the context of evidence obtained by remote-electronic
traffic devices, photos do not seem to be the type of evidence
that is difficult to evaluate and might cause either jurors or
judges to make a faulty decision. However, videotaped evidence is of greater concern because of its more persuasive
effect as discussed earlier in this article. Nevertheless, there
are procedural safeguards in place to address this problem such
as allowing the party to raise arguments about the weight of
the evidence, which in turn should ideally make it easier for
jurors to evaluate that evidence. Moreover, judges have the
power to overturn a verdict if they truly believe the jury has
erred. These and other procedural safeguards are enough to
counter this potential risk, and given the great probative value
of the evidence, it should still be admitted. In sum, although

Courts should take
several steps to
deal with videotaped evidence in
criminal contexts.

36. See Dufraimont, supra note 4, at 217.
37. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power
in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700 (1995).
38. See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
39. See Dufraimont, supra note 4, at 217.
40. For more detailed discussions about the point of comparison, see
Dufraimont, supra note 4, at 227-29.
41. See id. at 230; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J.
Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect
Trial Judges, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Chris Guthrie,
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) .
42. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Buckley v. Haddock,
292 Fed.Appx. 791 (11th Cir. 2008).
43. See, e.g., Harris, 550 U.S. 372.
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the introduction of juries into the criminal context has also
introduced the three attendant risks of bias, lawlessness, and
adjudicative incompetence, steps can be taken to reduce these
risks and therefore they do not necessitate an exclusion of evidence obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices.
iii. Current caselaw: A trend in admitting evidence and a
source of guidance for ways to counter the bias effect
As in civil cases, courts also generally admit evidence
obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices in the criminal
context.42 More importantly though, cases dealing with videotape evidence have recognized the bias effect of the video and
have taken steps to counteract it, thereby giving guidance to
how courts should respond in this context. These solutions
can easily be applied to videotape evidence obtained from
remote-electronic traffic devices, and particularly videotaped
evidence obtained from a police car dashboard such as when
the police officer is chasing after a car43 or even arresting a person during a traffic stop,44 where the concerns about bias are
most salient.
Courts should take several steps to deal with videotaped evidence in criminal contexts. First, they should do a preliminary
review of the evidence to avoid exposing jurors to potentially
inadmissible videotape evidence.45 Indeed, such a review has
become a common procedure followed by many courts46 and
should always take place if the opposing party has made an
objection to the evidence47 or made a request for in-camera
review.48 Such review can take place either before the trial, at
the very beginning of the trial if the party makes a motion in
limine, or during the trial but before the time the jury will view
the video.49 Obviously, earlier in the trial is better both to give
parties time to prepare and to conduct any editing if necessary.50
Courts should also conduct the review under the same conditions that the jury will view the evidence,51 so in other words,
if the jury is only able to view the video once, then the court
should do the same. Ideally though, both the judge and the
jury should be able to view the evidence as many times as
needed, particularly during deliberations, so that initial impressions of a high-speed chase, for example, do not overwhelm the
viewer and cloud his or her judgment. Indeed, courts often do
such preliminary reviews already52 and while the caselaw suggests that it is not reversible error when a court does not review
the video before playing it back for the jury,53 particularly if it

44. See, e.g., Buckley, 292 Fed. Appx. 791 (11th Cir. 2008) (considering video taken from police’s car of person refusing to obey the
police’s orders at a roadside stop and being tasered by cop).
45. See Gruber, supra note 3, at § 74.
46. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 214 (3d ed. 1984).
47. See Lee v. State, 526 N.E.2d 963 (Ind. 1988).
48. See Bailey v. Valtec Hydraulics, Inc., 748 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. App.
1988).
49. See Gruber, supra note 3, at § 74.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See 3 CHARLES C. SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1299 n. 54.5
(2d ed. 1991) (citing cases).
53. See State v. Burdgess, 434 So. 2d 1062 (La. 1983).

would have been admissible regardless,54 the preliminary
review is the better and recommended option for courts.55
Overall, even in the criminal context, caselaw shows that courts
are admitting evidence obtained from remote-electronic traffic
devices, and like in the civil context courts should also allow
defendants to raise questions as to the authenticity of the video.
However, with the introduction of the jury, they should follow
the steps courts have taken in other videotape cases and do a
preliminary review under the same viewing circumstances that
the jury would have in order to limit the potential prejudicial
effects of introducing the video into evidence.
iv. Summary judgment and its implications
This article would not be complete without discussing Scott
v. Harris, a Supreme Court case where the justices entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendant officer but relied
heavily on a video from the perspective of the police officer
who chased after the speeding driver and eventually rammed
his police car into the driver’s car.56 This case demonstrates the
power of video evidence and indeed provides many important
lessons about how judges should approach summary-judgment cases involving videos taken from remote-electronic traffic devices. Before getting to that, however, this article will
first generally discuss the rationales for having a jury and the
dangers of admitting a video into evidence and subsequently
relying too much on it when taking a decision out of the hands
of the jury.
1. BACKGROUND: THE RATIONALES FOR HAVING A
JURY
At the outset, it is important to understand why the criminal system has a jury in the first place because it is only
through understanding the jury’s function that one can understand what will be lost when a court takes a decision away
from the jury. While there are several rationales for having a
jury, this article will only discuss three of them: (1) they are
good fact-finders, (2) they temper the law on behalf of the
community, and (3) they legitimize the legal system.57 The
first rationale is a controversial one, and while there has been
an endless debate over whether jurors are in fact good factfinders,58 this article will assume that they are fairly good factfinders primarily because they have advantages as a group. For
instance, group deliberation encourages more thorough analysis and accurate verdicts: collectively, they remember more of
the evidence, their differing backgrounds allow them to do a

54. See Brandt v. French, 638 F.2d 209 (10th Cir. 1981).
55. See State v. Newman, 484 P.2d 473 (Wash. App. 1971).
56. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
57. Dufraimont, supra note 4, at 210-13. Another common rationale
is that juries educate the public because jury service is a form of
political participation where the public can learn about the justice
system. See id. However, again, this article will not discuss this
and other rationales because they are not very relevant to this context.
58. For more detailed analysis of this debate, see generally JAMES
BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW (1898). However, this debate is beyond the scope

better job interpreting the
[B]ypassing the
weight and import of eviprocedural
dence, and most importantly,
lingering biases that exist
safeguards or
among the jurors can be canrationales for
celed out in the jury room.59
The second rationale is the having a jury, new
counterpart to the previously
problems emerge
discussed risk of lawlessness.
because the
This rationale views the jury
as a defensive shield that can evidence may now
unduly influence
infuse the community’s values while flexibly applying
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2. PROBLEMS WITH ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE IN
SUMMARY-JUDGMENT CONTEXTS
Applying these rationales to the problem of summary judgment, it is clear that by admitting evidence, particularly videotaped evidence, and then bypassing the procedural safeguards
or rationales for having a jury, new problems emerge because
the evidence may now unduly influence the judges such that
they come to an incorrect or biased decision or a decision at
odds with what the local community might have ruled. At the
heart of all of this is the central concern that the court’s decision will lack legitimacy.
If the jury as a group is a good fact-finder, by extension,
many of the group benefits are lost with summary judgment.
This in turn means that the biases of the judges will be magnified, which can be problematic given the power of video evidence, and potentially lead judges to make an incorrect or
biased decision. Recall that one of the most important advantages of a group is that individual preexisting biases can be
canceled out in deliberations. These biases still linger even
after careful jury selection and can be important, as demonstrated by one study, which determined that when viewing a
videotape of evidence taken from a police dashboard camera
during a chase of a speeding party, African-Americans, lowincome workers, Democrats, and residents of the Northeast
were significantly more likely to favor the party being chased
by the cop.62 Jury deliberation allows jurors to air their view-

of this article.
59. See Dufraimont, supra note 4, at 210-11; RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT,
THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 42-51 (2003); REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE
THE JURY 81, 230 (1983).
60. See Dufraimont, supra note 4, at 211.
61. See id.
62. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?
Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 838, 841 (2009) (“African Americans, low-income workers,
and residents of the Northeast [including liberals and Democrats]
tended to form more pro-plaintiff views of the facts . . . .”).
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points and come to a group
consensus about the verdict
without being overly swayed
by the video. However, in
summary judgment, only
one or a few judges make a
decision. That means that if
the trial judge happens to be
a lower-income Democrat,
he or she might be more
likely to rule in favor of the
speeding party. In other
words, the judge’s individual preexisting bias may become
magnified in summary-judgment contexts.
Summary judgment involving videotape evidence is also
problematic with regards to the second rationale for juries, that
the jury tempers the law on behalf of the community. For
instance, perhaps residents of a southern state might have different views than the judges on an appeals court or other
higher court,63 particularly when judges may have more privileged backgrounds than the local community and thus view
the video differently. Thus, admission of the video into evidence can potentially cause a difference in the verdict a jury or
a judge might give.
Finally, summary judgment involving videotape evidence is
problematic when considering the last rationale for juries, that
they provide legitimacy to the system. As mentioned earlier,
the public believes a decision to be more legitimate when members of its group deliver a verdict, particularly because even if
jurors have differing viewpoints, the prevailing jurors are
obliged to listen during the critical moment of jury deliberations to those who have different views; this helps to allow the
losing party to accept the verdict without experiencing a sense
of domination or subjugation.64 However, when a court gives a
verdict or a view of the evidence that the public may not credit,
the decision arguably loses legitimacy because differing viewpoints are not expressed through the jury process. By bypassing the jury through summary judgment, the admission of the
evidence obtained by the remote-electronic traffic device
becomes a much bigger concern, and courts must be cautious
when dealing with this situation or risk losing legitimacy.
3. SCOTT V. HARRIS AND ITS LESSONS: WHAT
APPROACH COURTS SHOULD FOLLOW
Given that admitting videotape evidence obtained from a
remote-electronic traffic device can cause many problems in
the summary judgment context, what is the best solution?
Excluding the evidence is not ideal for all the reasons discussed earlier in this article. However, taking a closer look at

the Scott v. Harris case can provide many lessons for what to do
and what not to do for any court facing this dilemma.
In Scott v. Harris, a police officer filmed a high-speed chase
from a camera on his dashboard and subsequently bumped the
escaping driver’s car in the rear and caused the car to crash.
The driver became a quadriplegic as a result of the incident
and sued the police officer under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleging that using deadly force to terminate the chase was an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.65 In an
opinion that seemed to give great weight to the evidence
obtained from the remote traffic device as exemplified by such
statements as “[we] are happy to allow the videotape to speak
for itself”66 and even providing a link to the video with the
invitation to “see for yourself,” the Supreme Court reversed the
lower courts’ findings denying summary judgment.
Scott v. Harris gives several important lessons on what
judges should and should not do when faced with a summaryjudgment case involving evidence obtained from a remoteelectronic traffic device. Although this article will not delve
into the intricacies of all of the alternatives that the Court
might have chosen,67 it will extrapolate some general principles for courts facing summary-judgment cases involving
videotaped evidence.
First, judges faced with videotape evidence should be
aware of the potential biases and differing viewpoints that
prospective jurors might have. As one study suggests, the
Court in Scott v. Harris was prone to naïve realism, which
means that people are good at detecting group commitments
or biases animating other people’s beliefs, but correspondingly
naïve or poor at detecting this in themselves.68 To counteract
this problem, judges should perform a judicial humility mental check, or ask themselves to imagine who might disagree
with their viewpoint.69 If the other views are mere outliers,
then summary judgment is appropriate.70 However, in more
borderline cases where summary judgment may still have
been appropriate as it arguably might have been in Harris (one
study demonstrated that lay people did indeed come to the
same conclusion as the judges),71 judges still should be careful in their opinion to moderate their language. Perhaps
phrases such as “no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise”72 might have been avoided. In addition, perhaps more
deference should have been given to the speeding driver’s
point of view instead of hinting that the video told only one
set truth—such language indicates it is the judge’s view of the
video that is being imposed onto the parties in this case.
Again, this is undesirable because it undermines the legitimacy of the opinion itself.
Second, judges facing this situation should avoid sensorial
jurisprudence. In other words, they should not accord exces-

63. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 389 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[E]ight of the jurors on this Court reach a verdict that differs from the views of the judges on both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals who are surely more familiar with the hazards of driving on Georgia roads than we are.”).
64. See Kahan, supra note 62, at 885-86.
65. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. at 374-76 (majority opinion).
66. Id. at 378, n.5.

67. Kahan, supra note 62, at 894-903.
68. See id. at 895.
69. See id. at 898-900.
70. See id.
71. The debate about whether the case should indeed have been
decided the way it was decided is beyond the scope of this article.
For further reading, see id. at 887-94.
72. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007).
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sive weight to evidence and use such strong phrases as “[t]he
videotape tells quite a different story,” or repeated repetitions
of what “we see” and describing the chase as a “Hollywoodstyle car chase of the most frightening sort.”73 These phrases
indicate the judge may have indeed fallen prey to the inherent
biasing effects of the video that again undermines legitimacy.
While arguably appellate judges can constrain trial judges,
there is nowhere left to go for further review once the case
reaches the Supreme Court, and so higher courts in particular
should be careful about placing too much weight on a video,
especially because video evidence is known to be particularly
powerful.
Scott v. Harris provides important lessons for any court
faced with a summary-judgment case. Regardless of why a
court decides to take a decision outside of the hands of the
jury, it must be careful to avoid writing an opinion that detracts
from its own legitimacy. Courts should take steps to be more
neutral in their writing, to give credence to the differing viewpoints of the parties as well as the viewpoints that the evidence
might elicit in jurors, and to avoid language that hints that the
judges themselves have fallen prey to the inherent biasing
effects of a video. Such measures would be a good start to preserving legitimacy when the court bypasses the jury and its
attendant justifications. Indeed, these lessons apply to any case
involving evidence obtained by remote-electronic traffic
devices in which a judge may be asked to take the decision out
of the hands of the jury.
CONCLUSION

Like it or not, evidence obtained from remote-electronic
traffic devices is here to stay and courts should be responsive
to concerns about its admissibility. Although it seems fairly
simple to conclude that courts should almost always admit
such evidence in civil cases while allowing issues of authenticity to go toward the weight of the evidence, the arguments for
admissibility change significantly in the criminal context,
which features juries. Nevertheless, even there courts should

almost always admit such evidence. Although the weighing of
the three foundational factors alters slightly in the criminal
context, procedural safeguards as well as the great probative
value of the evidence still weigh in favor admission. Moreover,
the risks that come with the introduction of a jury can be mitigated through other means and are not enough to justify exclusion of the evidence. Caselaw supports the conclusion that the
evidence should be admitted while simultaneously providing
guidelines for future courts. Finally, with summary judgment,
the recent Supreme Court case of Scott v. Harris perhaps serves
as a cautionary tale of how such evidence may lead judges to
make potentially inflammatory comments that seemed to give
little credence to the driver’s or potential jurors’ points of view
and indeed seemed to suggest that the judges themselves had
fallen prey to the inherent biasing effects of the video. Courts
facing a situation where they are bypassing the jury, and therefore bypassing the attendant rationales for a jury, should
instead engage in a mental check of judicial humility to be sure
that they are not themselves being unduly influenced by the
evidence and thus undermining their own legitimacy.
Evidence obtained from remote-electronic traffic devices
will only continue to take on greater importance in the coming
years. While courts should continue to admit the evidence,
they should also be highly cognizant of setting limits and
guidelines for its use.
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